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Douglas Vexmillion* 
INmcmmIoN 
The purpose of this pper  is to contribute to discussions about the 
process of turning over irrigation systems fmm  the Government of Indonesia 
to water users. 
issues concerning policy and the process of implementationlas well as express 
scm  personal viewpoints. 
The intent is to identify and briefly describe the major 
Recently, several Asian governments (such as the Philippines,  Nepal, and 
Indonesia) -- as well as  developnent agencies, the Ford Foundation,  the World 
Bank, the Asian Developrent Bank, and the International Irrigation Management 
Institute (IIMI) -- have become  concerned with the need to turn over control 
and/or ownership of assets of government irrigation systems to water users. 
The growing movement toward turning irrigation systems over to farmers is 
consistent with the current interest in "ppivatizing" the production sectors 
of the economies of developing countries.  It is Wed  on a  desire to de- 
crease the bu?getary burdens of governments for irrigation operations and 
maintenance (W)  and to enhance the long-term sustainability of irrigation 
systems through  local control.  It is hoped that this will slow down the 
deterioration of systems and  limit the need for frequent rehabilitation. 
Over the last 15 years, irrigation system CXW  budgets in Indonesia have 
not been able to keep up with the increase in the nunber of government sys- 
tems constmted  or incorporated into the Public Works Department (Department 
Pekerjaan hun  or DPU) through the Prosida and Sederhana Programs.  There has 
been a tred  toward ever larger proportions of DPU provincial irrigation ser- 
vice O&M Wets  being used for routine personnel costs and less for mainten- 
ance-oriented supplies and resources. 
In IIMI research sites,  section heads (kepala  seksi) report that roughly 
only one-third of requested o&M funds are actually allocated by the DRI. 
the maintenance side,  the section heads tend to place first priority on the 
repair and maintenance of major water division structures of larger,  "tech- 
nical" systems,  then on the repair and desilting of main and secondary canals 
in such systems, then on the routine weeding and cleaning of these canals, 
and finally on the repir and maintenance of smaller and  "semi-technical" 
systems.  Generally speaking,  both budgetary allocations as well as actual 
outlays for smaller "less technical" systems are far less than those of lar- 
ger systems (either  on a  per-hectare or per-meter-of-channel basis). 
larger DPU systems, it is corrmon for irrigation inspectors (juru  peng  airan) 
to be responsible for setting and controlling twenty or more gates (each  of 
which, in principle, requires daily inspection,  discharge recordings and re- 
setting if needed). 
On 
Even in 
History tells us that the deterioration of irrigation systems is not 
*Social Scientist, IIMI-Indonesia,  Po Box  435 KBY, Jakarta  12001, Indonesia. 
1 inevitable.  Systems may appreciate in value, design capecity, and manage- 
ability over time, without dependence on the state. 
where, irrigation systems built by farmers often evolved from small diver- 
sions irrigating a  few hectares to larger, integrated networks (sometimes 
with only brush and stone weirs) which irrigate several thousand hectares. 
In locations such as in Bali,  West and North Sumatra,  Himachal Pradesh in 
India,  Northern Thailand, and the lowlands of Nepal, locally self-sustaining 
irrigation systems expanded and even improved over time through the regular 
investments and maintenance efforts of organized farmers.* 
ments in irrigation systems,  usually designing, constructing,  and  I  bperating 
systems  with little fanner participation. 
on the government for irrigation investments left the fanners without a sense 
of ownership of the systems and subsequently ercded the farmers’ sense of re- 
sponsibility for o&M as well.  However, fanners were expected to maintain the 
systems regularly at the tertiary level and occasionally to help repair dam- 
ages at the secondary level.  Requirements for payment of water service fees 
were often established. 
Nevertheless, fanoers often report dissatisfaction with government-built 
In Indonesia  land else- 
During the colonial and post-colonial era, governments made hue  invest- 
The ensuing pattern of dependence 
structures. 
water deliveries and maintenance services. 
government will rehabilitate the system every few years.  Hence, they tend to 
feel that it should be the role of the government to maintain its own  sys- 
tems.3 
irrigation developnent,  such attitudes will have to change,  as well as the 
policies which encourage them. 
effective in the long-run. 
They often become accustomed to the government providing free 
They come to expect that the 
If Indonesia is to mve  toward a more  self-sustaining pattern of 
hly  then can the turnover of systems  be 
By the nature of the issue, turning over government systems to farmers 
is embedded in nwcerous legal,  topographical,  hydrological, agricuj,tural, 
socioeconomic,  and organizational matters.  Answers to questions of exactly 
what management roles should be turned over,  which systems are to be turned 
over and how they should be turned over will require considerable adaptabil- 
ity to local physical and social conditions.  The scope and  style of system 
turnover must adapt to local settings,  needs and capacities.  Furthermore, 
national-level policies affecting turnover processes will evolve over time in 
response to changing economic and bdgetary priorities. 
If these assumptions are true, then it seems that what is needled  is not 
a  rigid, standard  framework for implementing turnovers,  which inevitably 
would be dependent on what are assumed to be universally-applicable criteria, 
but rather a  policy providing general guidelines and resources which would 
enable the evolution of flexible and locally-coherent  turnover prmesses. 
POLICY ISSUES 
What Roles Should Be Turned  Over? 
It may be that only maintenance obligations are turned over,  or both o&M 
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n below the offtake, or both o&M within the system as well as control (limited 
or full) of the system offtake gate.  Turnover also could include fanner 
acquisition of representative authority for managing diversions along a  river 
come,  coordinated by a federation of water users' associations.  Turnover 
may include only OM  control or also ownership of the system property or 
assets. 
expectation for providing assistance for major repirs  or rehabilitation. 
And  the government may turn over systems with or without any future 
Eech degree of turnover has its own  advantages and disadvantages.  For 
example, if only additional maintenance obligations are turned over to the 
farmers, they may see little benefit for them in the turnover.  At present 
the Government of Indonesia has maintenance responsibility for the offtake 
strwtures (weirs  in small DHJ  systems and tertiary offtakes,  sadap,  in lar- 
ger systems)  and 50  meters of channel below the offtake.  In such situations 
turnover of maintenance could mean giving farmers this responsibility and 
perhaps also (inverting  the 50-meter rule) giving fanners responsibility for 
maintaining 50 meters upstream and downstream from the offtake.  However 
systems may continue to deteriorate, or do so  even more rapidly,  unless the 
current expectations and incentives of farmers are altered.  If not, turnover 
might only help decrease government maintenance expenses in the short-term 
only to increase rehabilitation expenses in the long-term. 
Some view turnover as handing over a  carrplete maintenance role but in- 
complete water distributional role.  That is, leaving distribution within the 
system up to the farmers,  but keeping offtake gate Operation in the han&  of 
either the DHI weir keeper (beniaga  kendung),  if there is ane, the DFU gate 
keeper (penjaga  p  intu) or else the irrigation inspector.  Another variation 
of this is officially to turn over the weir keeper function (including  the 
gate key) to a  water user association (WUA)  -presentative.  This might be 
the WUA head if it were to become a  decision-making role, or else an assis- 
tant, if it were to be merely a  gate setting and regular maintenance role. 
Where weir or gate keepers or irrigation inspectors have too many gates to 
control, it appears that the WUA  head are often informally given the gate key 
anyway.  Also  it seems that even in larger, more technical  ystems,  the irri- 
gation inspector tends to delegate the function of measurin/f  discharge rates 
to the gate keeper,  a  function which could be delegated to fh  water users' 
representative without much training.  In scme  cases, f-rs  are able to, 
and often do,  reset the gate after the gate keeper or irrigation inspector 
have caoe and gone.  It is possible that a  farmer weir or gate keeper,  with 
some training, could be given official responsibility to maintain and operate 
the gate within certain guidelines and seasonal mximwn discharge limits 
tor would still be responsible for coordinating water use along a  river 
come. 
remuneration for services from the users. 
have social attachments which might hinder a  sense of responsibility for the 
broader irrigation network or river course. 
ally are local residents, often renting or owning land,  or having other 
"sideline" jobs. 
may relate to water distribution. 
,  provided by the irrigation inspector.  In such cases, the irrigation inspec- 
F'resunably, a farmer weir or gate keeper would receive additional 
Farmer representatives  undoubtedly 
However, DHJ gate keepers gener- 
So  they also tend to develop local social attachments that 
In some settings (such as where multiple small diversions are located 
3 
II along a river course), it may also be possible to organize a federation of 
water users' representatives along a  river course,  thus directly involving 
fanners in water management at this level.  This could enhance farmer apprec- 
iation of water distribution constraints at the river course level by setting 
up a  direct conmnmication mechanism between fanner representatives of systems 
which have been turned over to fanners.  This could further decrease the 
management burden of DPU at both the gate keeper and inspector levels. 
From observations of farmer O&M  activities on Java and elsewhere in 
Indonesia, it seems that farmers sometimes have little incentive to maintain 
channels if the timing of water deliveries is not felt to be approkriate or 
is not known in advance,  especially at the outset of the planting season. 
Hence,  with regard to fanner  involvement in M, the two functions are inter- 
related.  Turning over maintenance but not some operational functions as well 
will probably not alter the status quo.  Even if the irrigation inspectors 
could always guarantee appropriate deliveries, if the fanners are not aware 
of conditions elsewhere along the river course and do not have a  decision- 
making voice in operations,  they are not likely to develop a  sense of respn- 
sibility either for maintaining their own systems or for the equity of dis- 
tribution along the river course. 
Studies have shown that indirect investment approaches to irrigation 
developnent, such as the Village Subsidy Program (Subsidi  Desa),  which are 
based on local initiative and decision-making, prompt greater farmer partic- 
ipation in O&M (within  the systems) than do the less participatory, direct 
investment approaches,  such as in the Sederhana Program (Hafid and Hayami 
1979).  However,  at the river course level,  it has been reported that O&M 
performance within these systems eventually tends to decline where Subsidi 
Desa weirs proliferate along a river course, in an uncoordinated manner, 
causing water scarcity or siltation problems in lower sections of river 
courses (Direktorat  Jeneral Pengairan 1985).  As  yet there is no formal 
institution for regular farmer coordination between such systems. 
The question remains whether having a  measure of local control will be 
sufficient to provide fanners with a "sense of responsibility."  It has been 
argued that a "sense of ownership" (if  not actual ownership as well) of sys- 
tem assets is necessary in order to develop this corporate sense of respon- 
sibility among  farmers (Coward  1985).  At present there already is a  legal 
structure in place to enable the district government head (bumti)  to turn 
over management control of irrigation systems to farmers.  However,  the 
actual turnover of ownership of system assets,  which are currently public 
property  (milik  negara), is apparently a  much more complicated and time- 
consuming process which would involve higher levels of government, including 
the finance department. 
If this is the case, then turnover (if  it is to happen soon)  may have to 
pmeed  in a  two-step process.  First,  control of O&M  is turned over.  Later, 
actual ownership of system assets is turned over.  To the extent to which 
having actual ownership is a  necessary precondition for the farmerrt' sense of 
responsibility, it would make sense, if possible, to attempt to twn  over 
ownership as well as control,  at the same time. 
4 And yet it is not clear that ownership is necessarily something the 
fanners would value as an end in itself.  Various incentives or disincentives 
may be connected to it. 
right to contract for and supervise system repair.  Or it may grant the right 
for water users to apply as a  corporate body for loans or rehabilitation 
assistance (perhaps in some  sort of DFU/water users joint-supported arrange- 
ment).  % the negative side,  turnover of assets could entail the loss of 
services and rehabilitation support from DFU.  Or perhaps  it could result in 
the new obligation to pay a  tax on the assets. 
On the positive side, these may  entail the legal 
If farmers have the expectation that the government will pay for rehab- 
ilitation (requiring  no counterpart support from farmers), they will be more 
likely to defer making minor repairs and desilting work to some  anticipated 
government rehabilitation. 
control nor ownership entail unwanted side-effects on fanner incentives to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of "their" systems. 
Care should be taken that neither the turnover of 
What Should Be the Criteria for Selecting Systems for Turnover? 
Preliminary discussions among developnent bank and DPU personnel have 
Some propose that systems under 
emphasized the criterion of system size as the main basis for selecting which 
systems should be turned over to farmers. 
150 hectares (ha)  be turned over. 
size limit for turnover should be 500 ha.  Currently,  2,304  systems (about  34 
per cent of the total 6,731  DFU irrigation systems in Indonesia)  are below 
150 ha, 4,028  systems (60 per cent of DFU systems) are below 300 ha,  and 
4,717  (70 per cent of DFU systems) are below 500 ha.  However all system 
below 500 ha in size only constitute about 18.7  per cent of the total design 
area of DFU systems (which is about 4.8  million ha).  Systems below 150 ha 
constitute only about 3.9  per cent of the total area. 
all systems below 150 ha would constitute a  sizeable proportion of all DRT 
systems,  although it would be a  less significant part of the total area. 
Given the nature of maintenance priorities mentioned above,  a large 
Others propose that the maximum system 
Hen&e, a turnover of 
reduction in the number of small-scale systems under the o&M purview of DW 
may have more effect on decreasing personnel requirements than on decreasing 
actual maintenance expenditures (apart  from the question of rehabilitation). 
However,  turnover of smaller system3 will allow more intensive use of o&M 
staff and funds  in the larger systems.  At any rate, the turnover of all 
systems below 150 ha is a  very large process to -e  if it is to be done 
nation-wide. 
turnover of systems in 2 phases, first those below 150 ha and then those 
below 500 ha (each  phase lasting 6 years, nation-wide). 
Hence, it appears now that the government plans to conduct the 
But the next question is, "Should factors other than size be considered 
as criteria for selecting systems  suitable for turnover to farmers?" 
central and  section-level officials of DFU have expressed concern that other 
factors should be taken into account, such as the level of technical complex- 
ity or government investment in systems or the level of maintenance invest- 
ment required,  as determined by the nature of system water  sources,  the 
amount of sediment load in the water supply or the organizational capacity of 
the water users.  I  would add to this list the need to know the will of the 
Both 
I 
5 users to have total o&M responsibility and/or ownership of their system 
turned over to them. 
or interest will not help to instill either a  sense of ownership or a  concern 
for system sustainability. 
Turning over systems to farmers  without their consent 
For example, a  section head in West Java reported that he has  one systenl 
which is 87  ha in size. 
turned over to the farmers,  because it is a  technical system with cross 
regulators and  an adjustable offtake gate.  The gates need frequent adjusting 
and greasing.  Furthermore,the river emtmnkment imoediately upstream from the 
weir frequently collapses. 
system to be over Rp.  20,00O/ha  (US$12.13),4  which he thodt  was  too much of 
an additional burden on farmers. 
organized and  had their own water fee. 
He said that he would not recamend  that 08rM  be 
He estimated the annual maintenance Cost Of the 
In this we  the farmers  were very well 
However,  he also mentioned that there were other systems over 400 ha in 
size that he would recomnend be turned over to farmers. 
technical systems with simpler offtake structures and much lower O&M 
requirements.  Certainly both farmer and government budgetary capacities have 
to be considered. 
are directed toward the larger, technical systems (with smaller,  l(!ss  techni- 
cal systems receiving little, if any,  actual o&M support), then the turnover 
process may not actually save the government much money anyway.  It may only 
make the existing reality of the lack of  O&M  support for smaller,  less tech- 
nical systems become official policy. 
These were semi- 
However, if current DHJ O&M  spending priorities already 
Some have expressed concern that the provincial irrigation service of 
DRI my  feel threatened by the prospect of having a  significant proportion of 
their systems turned over to farmers -- out of the fear that provisional or 
section-level  o&M bdgets  may be cut,  due to the decreasinp area requiring 
DFU O&M  support.  However,  national-level DFU officials have stressed that 
o&M budgets will not be cut even though their service area decreases.  Fur- 
thermore, they have indicated that O&M  budgets in the future will be based on 
the total length of DFU channels and not on the number of hectares.  Undoubt- 
edly, this will help to adjust for topographical variations and be a  truer 
estimate of actual maintenance requirements. 
tive measure to changes in the number of HJ  systems in a  given area,  partly 
because of the 50-meter jurisdictional rule. 
Also  it would be a  less sensi- 
Nevertheless,  if the provincial and  section DRI  o&M budgets are not go- 
ing to be reduced as a result of turnovers, then the benefit to thf;  govern- 
ment of turnovers will not be to save total actual O&M  outlays,  but to permit 
more intensive use of funds on larger,  more  technical DFU systems.  Presumab- 
ly,  this would decrease the need for rapid cycles of rehabilitation and per- 
haps improve the long-term productivity and  sustainability of the larger sys- 
tems. 
The implications of the turnover of systems for DHJ field and office 
staff will have to be considered. 
the difficulty of relocating field staff away from systems which hrrve  been 
turned over to farmers. 
been assigned to government housing,  own and/or farm land,  or have sideline 
DW  officials have expressed concern about 
This is especially awkward where such staff have 
6 employment. 
and irrigation inspectors,  given their low salaries,  tend to have sideline 
income-earning activities. 
IIMI research is showing that most sampled weir and gate keepers 
Furthermore,  the nature of work for field staff at the subsection (= 
amatan)  level seems to be relatively more reigular and stable than that of 
office staff at the section and higher levels.  At the section level,  the 
work tends to be more cyclical,  with periods of little or no work for a  large 
part of the staff being followed by spurts of more intense nctivity by most 
or all of the staff, as periodic reports become due.  DFU sl!aff  usually see 
the lifestyle of the section office as preferable to that of  the subsection 
field staff.  This is due to the advantages of the cyclical versus regular 
work schedules and  the greater sideline income opportunities in the city. 
Therefore,  personnel tend to be quite willing to transfer from the subsection 
to the section levels but not the reverse.  The subsection level seems to be 
more understaffed than the section level,  and yet the subsection (or  field 
operations) level tends to be where o&M performance is most determined. 
Hence, transferring field staff out of areas where turnovers occur probably 
would mean assigning them to other field locations still at the subsection 
level.  In a  time of declining government budgets and resources, this could 
mean mre  uncertainty at the section levels and proportionately increasing 
resources and job security at the subsection levels. 
It is possible to implement the turnover of irrigation systems according 
to three basic models.  Gne is the blanket approach,  where a  key selection 
criterion (such  as size) is used for an otherwise indiscriminate  and rapid 
turnover of large nmbers  of systems. 
sive turnover of systems,  with little information-gathering (other  than size) 
and little or no physical and organizational improvements. 
this approach might assume that when faced with the hard realities of an 
abrupt detachment of farmers from a  dependent relationship with the govern- 
ment, fanners will learn to act collectively to ensure the sustainability of 
their systems as long as it is in their long-term interest to do so.  How- 
ever, social scientists have often shown that the existence of a  collective 
interest is not by itself a  sufficient condition for prompting individual 
action for the group’s benefit.5 
The emphasis is on q+jck  and inexpen- 
F’roponents of 
A  second model is the diagnostic approach,  where more intensive informa- 
tion is obtained by experts about hypothesized multiple factors affecting 
systems appropriate for turnover and their needs in preparation for turnover. 
The information useful for the selection and needs identification stages is 
assumed to be known in advance. 
emphasis than the blanket approach on preparation for long-term sustainabil- 
ity. 
emergence of a learning process (Bagadion  and Korten 1985;  Lorten 1980). 
The diagnostic approach places greater 
Nevertheless, essentially it is a  top-down process which hinders the 
i 
A  third model is the dialogue approach.  It includes much of the same 
information-gathering process as the diagnostic approach but does so in a 
more interactive way.  It encourages a  process of faxmer group self-selection 
7 for turnover,  mutual DFV/farmer identification of system improvement and 
management needs, and a  process of dialogue and mutual adjustment both prior 
to and following the turnover. 
for cultivating attitudes of self-reliance and for establishing the kind of 
relationship that should exist between farmers and DPU in the future.  This 
relationship will not be one of total detachment,  but rather a  combination of 
local initiative, coordination with DFU and other fanner-managed system,  and 
occasional farmer petitioning for assistance from DFU. 
description of a  dialogue approach to the process of turning over irrigation 
systems to fanners. 
A Scenario for the Turnover Process 
The latter model seeins  to have more potential 
The following is a 
The following description is of the most intensive kind of turnover 
preparation (involving  both physical improvements  and substantial new manage- 
ment roles).  Many  locations, especially off Java and Bali (where  most sys- 
tems below 150 ha in size have brush and stone free intakes) my  require much 
less intensive turnover preparation activities. 
Stage me  -- pro.ject preparation.  Inmediately  before the turnover pro- 
cess begins within the section, introductory meetings and visits are held, 
recruiting of cmunity  organizers (COS) and other staff begins and the river 
course irrigation inventory and socio-technical profile instruments are 
prepared and field tested.  Estimated time required: 1.5  months. 
Stage Two  -- conducting a  river course irrigation inventorp.  An  inven- 
This 
tory of all systems along a  given river course is first conducted in order to 
obtain basic infomation  about all diversions along a  river course. 
might include overlaying onto existing maps the locations of all i’rrigation 
diversions and respective command areas along the length, or part of the 
length, of a  river course.  Assembling the buku pintar.(doclanents  describing 
the besic physical parameters of DFV systems) would provide information on 
the size of conmmnd area and the nature of physical structures in the sys- 
tems, such as the type and size of weir, water measurement structures and 
channels.  It also serves to classify systems according to their level of 
technical complexity. 
istrative boundaries of the systems,  nature of all water sources,  mount of 
sedimentation,  topographical setting and the existence of a  water users 
association. 
Additional information could be gathered about admin- 
Information gathered during the inventory stage would enable R  section- 
level Turnover Support Group (TSG)s to make preliminary selection of a large 
set of systems which seem to qualify for turnover according to a  generally- 
agreed-upon set of basic criteria.  The TSG would then better understand the 
implications  of turnover for the river course management as a  whole. 
Eligible systems would then be grouped into at least three categories: 
a) those which were incorporated into the DFV inventory of systems via admin- 
istrative reclassification alone (i-e.,  from farmer-managed to DPU-managed), 
b) those which require mostly management training and shifting of roles but 
little physical construction and design work, and c) those which have a  his- 
tory of heavy DPY investment (such  as major rehabilitation or daily DFU staff 
8 mmagement)  or which require major physical upgrading prior to turnover. 
turnover process would be quite different for each of these three types of 
systems. 
systems directly determine the level of preparation needed to turn systems 
over to the local resources of the witer users. 
The 
It can  be hypothesized that prior levels of DRI investment in the 
Curing the inventory process, recruitment of a3a could begin.  Prefer- 
ence should be given to recruitia  COS  fran awng  the more capable or moti- 
vated of DRI staff itself, either at the iection or subsection levels.  The 
00 assignment could be considered tempora~y,  providing valuable experience in 
innovative water management approaches and leading to later job advancement. 
COS  recruited in such a  manner generally would be without university degrees 
and  would require both prior and on-the-job training.  Wlt the cost wuld  be 
much  less than  that of recruiting university-trained 00s  fmm  outside DRI. 
And this use of DKJ personnel  would be invaluable in building DKJ capacity to 
manage water through a  dialogue approach with farmers. 
After  the set of potential systems  hn.  been selected,  coamunity organiz- 
ers could be chosen since the general are  L  of the systems to be turned over 
would then be known.  Or if the Coa  yere  xted from a section-wide pool, 
their selection and training could begin  n earlier. 
be done partly mder  the direction of a provincial-level specialist (perhap 
together with a  consulting mterpart)  an1 would continue into the profile 
preparation stage.  The role of the unive-sity-trained Advisory CO  would be 
to help train and supervise  COS,  and to b directly responsible for the turn- 
over of at least one system. 
direct experience and credibility. 
Training of COS  might 
This will provide the Advisory 00 with more 
It is unlikely that the turnover process, when it becomes a  national 
program, will have the resources to permit the assignment of one 0  per sya- 
tem.  It is more likely that one CO  would have to be responsible for several 
systems along a  river course.  Therefore,  COS should wrk  closely with irri- 
gation inspectors and obtain their assistance in the following stages of 
turnover.  Training of COs  could begin imaediately after their selection. 
This might involve a six-week intensive training course, followed by on-the- 
job training in preparation of the socio-technical profile (see below).  The 
irrigation inspectors should receive sane  training to enable them not only to 
understand the turnover pmcess  but to assist the (3 regularly as an impor- 
tant actor at the inter-system level. 
months for inventory and intensive training of cOs.7 
Bstimated time for Stage Two: two 
Stage Three -- making  socio-technical profiles.  Wring this stage, the 
regular COs  wuld  be guided by  the Advisory U3  and "33 members, and wuld  be 
assisted by the irrigation inspector,  along with weir keepers perhaps and 
some  technical assessment assistance fmm  the section-level technical divi- 
sion staff (bagian  teknis).  A  sccio-technical profile of each of the pma- 
pective systems would be prepared, with the expectation that about four out 
of five of the systems profiled wuld  be turned over. 
The pupose of profile-making would be mainly to assess the systems' 
needs  in preparation for turnover, rather than for uae in an involved and 
mnecessarily discriminating pmceduFe  for selecting the most appropriate 




climate,  large nmbers  of small systems are likely to be turned over.  Hence, 
more priority should be given for preparing for turnover than  for deciding in 
a  thorough way which systems (below  a  specified size) are ideally suited for 
being turned over.  It is assumed that enough infomation  can be obtained in 
the inventory stage to enable selection,  on the average, of five systems,  of 
uhich four will finally be selected. 
Given the current and likely future budeetar?r and Policy 
bofile-making would cover gathering more specific information about the 
actual physical condition of structures,  a  sketch map of the system itself, 
and identification of physical improvement requirements prior to turnover 
(distinguishing  between improvements by fanners and those requiring DFU 
assistance).  It would also specify new tasks after the physical improvements 
and turnover,  and a final assessment of the farmer organizational capacity 
available and of areas which need strengthening. 
together should identify physical and organizational needs and tasks so  that 
the profile is a joint product conveying both the assessment of the CO as 
well as the wishes, intents and local knowledge of the farmers. 
time for Stage Three: 2.5  months. 
The Q3  and the farmers 
Estimated 
SWe  Four -- selecting systems.  The final selection of a  se;  of sys- 
tems would be done concurrently with the latter part of Stage Threli. 
point the regular 02,  the Advisory 0,  the TSG, and the seation head would 
evaluate the profiles and select not only which systems should be turned 
over,  but the time-table for each system, on a  case-by-case -is.  Some 
staggering of turnover implementation will undoubtedly be necessary along a 
given river course.  Estimated time for Stage Four: one month, concurrent 
with Stage Three. 
At this 
Stage Five -- preparim for turnover of o&M control.  During this stage, 
the required physical improvements are carried out while organizing and 
training fanners. 
tional way, but at the request and advice of the farmers,  mobilizing fanners 
for all unskilled labor and perhaps  to raise funds for improvements. 
would assist the farmers in preparing their own  collective version of a 
design for system improvement. 
farmer-version design is completed and then proceed in dialogue with the 
fanners. 
Physical improvements should not be made  in the conven- 
02 
DFW  design work should begin just before the 
If possible, the technical design work should be done by DPLJ  staff. 
Construction should be carried out by the farmers themselves.  Contracting 
out the design and wnstmtion  work to  private contractors may seriously 
hinder opportunities for farmer participation in system improvements -- an 
essential element in the emergence of both farmer conceptions of system own- 
ership and a  dialogue relationship  between farmers and DPU. 
The organizing of fanners should not be done as a  separate activity,  but 
as a part of the process of identifying and implementing new tasks created by 
the physical improvements  and the new o&M roles related to turnover.  mly  in 
this way will the organizing be based on real needs and personal experiences. 
The CO would be the key person to assist the farmers in this stage of prepar- 
ation for turnover and in ensuring that a  climate of dialogue develops 
10 between the fanners and the irrigation inspector,  weir keeper,  and technlcal 
staff of the section office which assists in a  monitoring and consultative 
capacity regarding physical improvements of the TSG. 
TSG periodically about the farmers’  progress and management performance. 
COS  would report to the 
Also during this stage,  the weir keeper or irrigation inspector’s  o&M 
functions to be turned over would be gradually carried out by a water user 
representative selected by the users’ group.  He would be assisted and super- 
vised by the irrigation inspector, the CO and perhaps a  member of the TSG. 
Preparations would be made to alter the job assignments of the weir keeper or 
irrigation inspector. 
keeper to another location in a  larger system or else to a  broader, coordina- 
ting role along the river course. 
This might involve the reassigning of a  weir or gate 
Estimated time for Stage Five: 12 months. 
Stage Six -- the turnover of O&M  control.  The actual date of official 
turnover my  be contingent upon the completion of physical improvements and 
the progress of organizational preparations. 
dards that are too high since the systems will need time to more fully adjust 
to the changes in a long-term mode of operation. 
mony should be conducted,  perhaps with the attendance of the district-level 
government head (m)  and the DW  section and subsection heads. 
time it may be useful also to turn over necessary forms,  advice,  and approv- 
als to start an administrative process for fanners to petition for the later 
turnover of systems assets. 
ly assigned to other jobs and/or locations. 
two weeks, done concurrently with the latter part of Stage Five. 
The TSG should not use stan- 
An  official turnover cere- 
At this 
Affected weir or gate keepers would be official- 
Estimated time for Stage Six: 
Stage Seven -- memation  for turnover of assets and for a role at the 
river course level.  This is the time when the CO  assists the water users in 
moving forward their petition for turnover of assets. 
ted by a sort of extension person from the Department of Internal Affairs 
(Department  hlan  Negeri), would help train the water users’ group in the 
legal aspects of becoming a  corporate body which can obtain loans and enter 
into contracts.  The CO  would perform a  liaison function between the water 
users and the various offices, which would include the Department of Internal 
Affairs, DW,  the Finance Department, the camat,  the district head, and so 
on. 
formance of the system both from the perspective of the faimers and the irri- 
gation inspector or other operational field staff. 
and perceptions of management performance would be comunicated between far- 
mers and the DW,  further enhancing the process of dialogue. 
would facilitate further organizational changes as needed.  Also this would 
be a time when the water users would need some  assistance in possibly taking 
on an expanded role in a  federation of fanner and DPV-managed systems along 
the river course. 
with the irrigation inspector. 
The 0,  perhaps assis- 
During this period the CO would continue to monitor the management per- 
Differences in criteria 
The CO also 
The CO  would also be involved in this process, together 
Furthermore,  this may be a  time when fanners from other systems which 
It is hoped that the early systems selected for turnover would 
were not originally selected may petition for turnover as they observe what 
is happening. 
provide a  positive example to farmers in other small systems so that they 
would later seek entry into the turnover program.  Especially where small 
11 systems along river courses are turned over,  what is needed for the future is 
not the abrupt and oomplete detachment of DFW  from the water  users,  but a  new 
kind of dialogue based on greater local control. 
petition for turnover. 
reduce the need for extensive information gathering by outsiders.  Selection 
should be a two-way process, perhapa  with self-selection beb  preferable to 
diagnostic survey selection. 
provide general information abut  system turnover to WA or village heads in 
their areas of jurisdiction. 
During this stage, the CO may begin to transfer some  of his or her com- 
munication and monitoring functions to the irrigation inspector.  Eventually 
the CO’s  involvement will become  less intensive in the systems and he or she 
may begin to take on other systems or may change status (perhaps becrming an 
irrigation inspector or a section-level TSG member-assuming the COS  were re- 
cruited from the section-level DFU itself).  Estimated time for Stage Seven: 
six mnths. 
Farmers should I=  able to 
This could help simplify the selection prtrcess and 
The TSG should encourage such petitions and 
Starre Eight -- the turnover of assets.  The actual time required to 
obtain legal ownership of system assets will be highly variable and often 
lengthy. 
the water users  until they achieve legal ownership.  However,  section-level 
Advisory COS  may be trained to provide occasional legal guidance to WA  rep- 
resentatives after Stage Seven, when the COS  are no longer regularly involved 
in their system. 
Table 1 is a  sunmary of the proposed time schedule for the turnover of 
It will not be feasible for a  CO to continue to regularly assist 
I 
o&M control and systems assets. 
Table 1.  Time schedule (in  months) for turnover of a  system. 
Subtotal  Cumulative total  Stage 
Cne  Project prepsation  1.5  1.5 
Two  Inventory  2.0  3.5 
Three  Fmfile  2.5  6.0 
Four  Selection*  6.0 
Five  OBrM turnover preparation  12.0  18.0 
Six  Turnover of OBrMS  18.0 
Seven  Assets turnover preparation  6.0  24.0 
Eight  Assets turnover  *a  .......................................................................... 
*Concurrent with previous stage; **cannot be specified. 
0 
Section-level Time Schedule  and Institutional  Assuuptions 
Figure 1 is a  time schedule for implementing, at the section level, the 
This example is for an above 
turnover of systems below either 150 or 500 ha (or possibly cauponents of 
larger systems, such  as secondary canals). 
average-sized process with at least 41 systems eligible for turnover. 
12 The above time schedule for section-level turnover activities is based 
on the following set of assumptions abut  how the process would be organized. 
1. Most COs  would be recruited from DPU wherever possible. 
would have only high school degrees  (s?M or SMA), but would have a  long-term 
interest in DFU and be less inclined to switch to other jobs. 
2.  The Advisory CO  should be a  non-DPU recruit with a  bachelors degree (ggg= 
-1,  probably in one of the social sciences. 
3. The Advisory CO  would have only one or two systems of his or her own at a 
time so  that he or she can provide advice and support to the other COs. 
4. Four regular 0s and one Advisory CO  per section is probably the maximum 
number which can be monitored and supported by the section-level TSG. 
5.  One regular CO  can  manage one system turnover during the first set of 
to be effective, then more efficient). 
6.  By the third and fourth sets of turnovers,  an experienced regular CO work- 
ing in three systems (being  in each system one or two full days per week) 
would be able to perform the necessary functiona of building local capacity 
for new system improvement  and OM  roles. 
7. The Advisory 03  would manage one system during the first set and two sys- 
tems during each of the remaining sets,  enabling him or her to assist the 
other COs  as needed. 
8.  There would be a  section-level TSG  of two to three section-level staff 
assigned half-time (possibly  with one assigned full time) to turnovers. 
9. There would be a  province-level TSG with three or four part-time and one 
full-time DFU staff assigned to turnovers.  The full-time person would work 
at the section level during the first set of turnovers in the first section 
scheduled for turnovers. 
Thus most COS 
turnovers and three during the secocd  through fourth sets ( 1  'irst learning how 
1, 
13 10. me  or two full-time consultant CO trainers at the provincial office 
would train and monitor COs,  provincial and section-level TSC members and 
activities and assist in planning turnover implementation  at province and 
section levels.  4 
11. A  consulting group and a  national-level TSG from the Directorate General 
of Water Resources Developnent (DGWRD),  each with part and full-time staff 
have been assigned to plan, monitor and supervise recruitment, training, 
pilot project testing and general implementation of the turnover process. 
12. In the evolution of the turnover process, exponential growth in the nm- 
ber of systems being turned over is not likely beyond what four regular and 
one Advisory W  and TSG can manage (a  maximum of 14  systems at a  time per 
section). 
A Pilot Project 
A  pilot project should be conducted as the first phase of a  nation-wide 
program for turning over government systems to farmers. 
should be selected,  one on and one off Java.  As  a  real pilot project, its 
implementation should enable replication on a  national scale. 
jects there is a tendency to conduct the developent activity far more inten- 
sively (with  more DRI staff,  CDS,  resomes,  and  training) than  could realis- 
tically be done on a  national level. 
Only two provinces 
In pilot pro- 
However, the monitoring and resd  component of the pilot project 
should be more careful and detailed than  in a  normal turnover process,  be- 
cause the main purpose of the pilot project is the learning process.  But to 
the extent to which the pilot system gets more program support than  is rea- 
listic to expect under a  nod,  nationwide process, it inhibits our learning 
about its nationwide applicability.  The most important questions regarding 
the turnover of systems to farmers,  where reseamh plays an important role, 
are not pre-implementation policy questions, such as "What kinds of systems 
should be turned over?" or "What roles should be turned over?" 
questions on how systems should be turned over while implementing the turn- 
over program.8 
conducting a  pilot study of turnover: 
- 
Th?y are 
Consideration should be given to the following approaches to 
Implementing a  turnover process which is thought to be both advisable 
and broadly applicable (an  approximation of what would be likely to be 
implemented on a  national scale). 
Within a  given province, selecting three or four systems alony a river 
course which would be turned over while analyzing the process in all 
three (though  perhaps not with the same level of intensity). 
Comparing systems within a  province which vary in levels of intensity of 
program support and training. 
- 
- 
-  Assigning one regular CO at first to one, then three systems,  on the 
average. 
14 -  coolparing three or four systems which differ according to: upper or 
lower location along the river course,  the need for physical improve- 
ments and/or current organizational capcity. 
lam 
1.  The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily 
those of IIMI or the Public Works Department of Indonesia. 
2.  See Spencer  (1974)  and coward and  Levine (1986)  for compmtive  analyses 
of these processes. 
3. For  example,  see Syaikhu Usman and Bochari Fbchman  (1984)  and Siy (1986). 
4.  Indonesian Rupiah 1,648  USt1.00  (November  1986). 
5.  See Axelrod (19841,  Margolis (1984),  Heath (1976),  and Olson (1971). 
6.  Initially,  this coamittee might be section-level DFU staff,  assigned part 
or full-time to turnovers. 
the provincial DFU office and by a trained provincial-level TSG. 
7.  Once the process begins to em,  it is possible that CO  selection and 
training for subsequent locations could begin before the inventory stage. 
8.  See Korten (1986)  for a  discussion about action research on the process of 
implementing irrigation developnent program. 
They would be assisted by a  consulting group from 
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